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With the rapid development of economy, there are new demands for the construction 
and operation of the public goods. The current public program exist the following two 
questions: one is the shortage total amount of investment; the other is that the supply of 
quality assurance and efficiency is relatively low. The government’s limited financial 
resources and the supplying mode of monopoly can’t meet the needs of society, there are 
growing calls to pull in social investments. Public-private partnership (PPP) is considered as 
the critical model to promote the qualities of the public goods through the partnerships 
between the public sector and the private sector. The PPP model not only eases the financing 
difficulties, but also introducing the efficient management mode of the private sector. The 
PPP model improves the investment efficiency of the public program. The basic form of 
practical implementation of the PPP is the contract signed. As work matters impossible to list 
all through the contract, contract is incomplete. If the contracts are incomplete, the 
controlling configuration becomes the critical factor to incentive the investment of the 
factors. Different control allocation of incentive effect to managers is different, thus will 
produce a different social welfare and efficiency results. The government can encourage the 
investment of the parties and reduce the cost of supervision through the control rationally. 
Basis on the completely synthesizing the available research results, this paper develops 
a theory of allocation of authority between two parties that produce public program. We 
show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of 
goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. Control rights should be given to 
the high-valuation party, irrespective of technological factors, when the degree of impurity is 
large as long as one party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. When the 
degree of impurity is small, control rights should be given to the investor. If the importance 
of the parties’ investments is similar and the degree of impurity is small, then the 
high-valuation party should receive the authority. Further analysis points out, when a 
positive externality exists across stages of building and managing facilities, bundling is 
optimal; but unbundling may be preferred when the externality is negative.  
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从 1992 年英国政府率先发起 PFI①（Private Finance Initiative）开始，PPP 日益成为
各国政府实现其经济目标，提升公共服务水平的重要措施，不仅被广泛应用于各种大
型的交通项目，还越来越多地出现在水务、能源、垃圾回收、废水处理，乃至医疗服




20 多年以来 PPP 模式在我国基础设施建设和公共服务供给领域发挥了重要的作用。据
世界银行统计，1990 年至 2009 年，中国基础设施投资领域中，私人部门参与的项目有
941 个，总投资额达 1108 亿美元②。近年来，我国已出现了一些大型的公私合作项目，
如北京 2008 年奥运会中成为全球瞩目的国际体育场（鸟巢）就约有三分之二的场馆建
设采用了 PPP 模式。 
据 2010 年统计年鉴显示，2009 年全社会固定资产投资 224598.8 亿元，其中国有












































交易成本：不可预见的或然情形（unforeseen contingencies）、签订合同的成本（cost of 









（Foss 和 Foss，2000）。 
继Coase在他的开创性论文中第一次谈及合同的不完全性之后，Williamson（1979）、
Klein（1980）、Shavell（1980）和 Dye（1985）等很多学者也都探讨了合同的不完全性
问题。Grossman 和 Hart（1986）以及 Hart 和 Moore（1990）的两篇奠基性论文通过建
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立数学模型，正式提出了不完全合同理论（即 GHM 理论）。 






















在不完全合同理论的基础上，Hart，Shleifer 和 Vishny（1997）将 GHM 模型运用
于公有产权改革的分析中，在一个不完全合同框架中分析了公共部门所有和私人承包
两种情况对公共产品或服务成本、质量改进的不同影响，讨论了公共部门提供公共产































































HSV 模型不完全适用于研究公共部门和私人部门采用 PPP 合作模式合作生产公共产品
时的控制权配置问题。 
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